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Director Shareownership and Corporate Performance in South Africa 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between director shareownership and corporate 
performance in South Africa using a sample of 169 listed firms from 2002 to 2007. Our 
results suggest a statistically significant and positive association between director 
shareownership and corporate performance. By contrast, we find no evidence of a non-
linear effect of director shareownership on corporate performance. Our findings are robust 
across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneity problems 
and corporate performance proxies. Overall, our results provide support for agency theory, 
which suggests that director shareownership can reduce agency problems by aligning more 
closely the interests of shareholders and corporate executives, and thereby improving 
corporate performance.  
 
Keywords: corporate governance, corporate performance, director shareownership, South 
Africa, endogeneity 
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Introduction 
This paper examines the crucial policy question of whether director shareownership 
(DOWN) affects corporate performance in South Africa (SA). Agency theory has suggested 
a number of different mechanisms for resolving agency problems in modern corporations, 
whereby ownership is separate from control (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a). In the 
main, these mechanisms consist of incentive alignment (i.e., director pay, options and 
shareownership) and monitoring (i.e., corporate governance, disclosure, and auditing) 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983b).  
 With specific respect to SA, close to two decades of incentive alignment and 
monitoring reforms have been pursued, mainly in the form of the 1994 and 2002 King 
Reports on corporate governance (CG) (Ntim et al., 2011, 2012). Consequently, the King 
Reports have generally focused on improving corporate performance by raising CG 
standards in SA firms (Ntim, 2011, 2012). More specifically, however, the central objective 
of the reforms has been to reduce agency costs by aligning the interests of shareholders 
with those of managers through: (i) enhancing the independence and monitoring capacity of 
SA boards; and (ii) providing them with appropriate incentives (King Committee, 2002).  
 An important proxy for measuring the degree of managerial interests’ alignment 
with those of shareholders is DOWN (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990). In 
fact, the ongoing extensive public policy (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993) and 
academic (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Himmelberg et al., 1999; 
Andre, 2008) debate on the role and effectiveness of DOWN in reducing agency conflicts by 
aligning the interests of shareholders and managers indicates that DOWN may affect 
corporate performance. However, and whilst there is a theoretical consensus that DOWN 
can reduce agency costs and improve performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 
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1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b; Jensen, 1993), the empirical evidence on the impact of 
DOWN on performance is conflicting (Demsetz, 1985; Davies et al., 2005).  
 A number of reasons, however, have been offered that may explain the mixed 
results of prior studies. First, previous studies have been criticised for potential 
methodological weaknesses (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; Beiner et al., 
2006), with a considerable number of them employing OLS, as well as not adequately 
addressing endogeneity problems (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 1999), and 
thereby resulting in misleading findings. Second, it has been suggested that the link 
between DOWN and corporate performance may not just vary by firm-specific 
characteristics (Cheung and Wei, 2006; Krivogorsky, 2006), but also by variations in 
country-specific CG and institutional heterogeneities (Short and Keasey, 1999; Kapopoulos 
and Lazaretou, 2007). Despite this issue, previous studies investigating the impact of DOWN 
on performance are primarily concentrated in a limited number of developed countries, 
which depicts comparatively similar institutional contexts (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; 
Laing and Weir, 1999; Weir and Laing, 2000; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001).  
However, and arguably, in emerging countries with different CG practices and 
institutional contexts, the effectiveness of DOWN may differ, and as such, the link between 
DOWN and performance can be expected to be different from what has been reported in 
developed countries. Therefore, an examination of the impact of DOWN on performance in 
a major developing African country, where there is acute dearth of empirical evidence will 
be critical in providing a more complete understanding of the effect of DOWN on 
performance (Cheung and Wei, 2006; Krivogorsky, 2006; Ntim and Osei, 2011).  
Consequently, we investigate the link between DOWN and performance for a 
sample of SA listed firms. SA provides an interesting context to examine the impact of 
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DOWN on performance. Similar to other Anglo-American countries, SA has carried out CG 
reforms, mainly in the form of the King Reports with the main objective of reducing 
shareholder and managerial interests’ divergence by enhancing the level of director 
monitoring and incentives (Ntim, 2009; Ntim et al., 2011). With particular respect to 
director incentives and shareownership, the 2002 King Reports encourage directors to hold 
shares of companies that they run in order to improve interests alignment, including 
specifying that the performance-related elements of director pay, such as vested shares and 
options should form a substantial part of the total director compensation.  
However, the SA corporate context has unique characteristics (Ntim, 2009). These 
include: (i) greater institutional ownership; (ii) high block ownership, including 
government ones; (iii) weaker shareholder activism; and (iv) poor record of implementing 
and enforcing corporate laws (Ntim and Osei, 2011; Ntim, 2011, 2012). For instance, 
greater block ownership can limit the effectiveness of the market for corporate control 
(Ntim et al., 2011, 2012). Arguably, this can have severe implications on whether 
companies will engage in voluntary compliance with and disclosure of CG rules, including 
those relating to DOWN, which can potentially impair the capacity of a voluntary code to 
improve CG standards in SA. Thus, we contend that the rich research context in terms of 
the: (i) differences with developed countries; (ii) recent CG reforms carried out; and (iii) 
the severe dearth of past evidence, offer a compelling basis to examine the link between 
DOWN and corporate performance in SA listed firms. 
Our study seeks to make a number of new contributions to the extant CG literature. 
First, using a sample of 169 SA listed firms from 2002 to 2007, we provide evidence on the 
link between DOWN and corporate performance. To the best of our knowledge, this 
represents one of the first attempts at modelling the impact of DOWN on corporate 
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performance within an African context, with particular reference to SA, and thus crucially 
extends the literature to that continent. It also contributes to the predominantly developed 
countries-based literature on the link between DOWN and corporate performance. Second, 
we examine whether DOWN is non-linearly related to the corporate performance. Finally, 
and unique from most past studies, we employ econometric techniques that sufficiently 
address different types of endogeneity problems and alternative corporate performance 
measures.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the extant 
literature on DOWN and corporate performance. The following sections present the data 
and research methodology, report empirical analyses and concluding remarks. 
 
Literature Review: Theory, Evidence and Hypothesis Development 
DOWN is an important CG mechanism that the theoretical literature suggests can reduce 
agency problems by aligning the interests of shareholders and managers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b), and thereby enhancing corporate 
performance. However, there are two contrasting theoretical propositions: convergence-of-
interests and entrenchment.  
 Agency theory suggests that DOWN helps in reducing the conflicts of interest that 
exists between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; 
Jensen, 1993). Specifically, it is suggested that as the proportion of equity owned by 
directors increases, their interests and those of shareholders become more aligned and thus, 
the incentive to indulge in opportunistic behaviour diminishes (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; 
Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). This is because the greater their financial stake in the form of 
DOWN, the greater the costs they will incur for not maximising shareholders wealth. 
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Consequently, directors who own large blocks of shares have additional incentive to 
actively monitor managerial actions that can help reduce agency costs and increase 
corporate performance. 
However, another strand of the theoretical literature suggests director entrenchment 
as an alternative hypothesis to convergence-of-interests (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell 
and Servaes, 1990; Short and Keasey, 1999). The entrenchment hypothesis proposes that at 
low levels of DOWN, the competitive internal and external market forces (discipline) can 
help align the interests of directors with those of shareholders. However, it contends that at 
high DOWN levels, directors may hold sufficient voting power to protect themselves 
against such disciplinary forces, and therefore directors will prefer to pursue non-wealth 
maximising goals. This is because the private benefits in the form of perquisites 
consumption, such as guaranteed employment with attractive salaries that will accrue to 
directors are greater than the utility that they will obtain from pursuing optimal projects that 
will increase the wealth of all shareholders. This leads to director entrenchment in which 
other shareholders are unable to remove or influence the actions of the managing directors, 
even in the face of serious under performance or misbehaviour. In this case, the DOWN-
performance link is expected to be negative. 
Further, the theoretical literature suggests that combining the convergence-of-
interests hypothesis with the entrenchment hypothesis gives rise to a non-linear director 
DOWN-performance link (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990). This means 
that at low levels of DOWN, interests’ alignment may help increase corporate performance. 
However, at high levels of DOWN, director entrenchment impedes beneficial takeovers, 
and thus decreases corporate performance. 
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Consistent with the conflicting nature of the theoretical literature, the empirical 
evidence on the DOWN-corporate performance association is mixed (Morck et al., 1988; 
Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Davies et al., 2005). Specifically, a group 
of researchers reports positive relationship (Krivogorsky, 2006; Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 
2007), another documents negative association (Laing and Weir, 1999; Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001; Andre, 2008), while a third group finds a non-linear link between DOWN 
and corporate performance (Morck et al., 1988; Davies et al., 2005). 
 Morck et al. (1988) investigate the association between DOWN and corporate 
performance using a cross-sectional sample of 371 Fortune 500 US firms in 1980. They 
report a non-monotonic link between DOWN and corporate performance. This suggests that 
corporate performance first increases, then declines, and finally increases slightly, as 
DOWN increases. Specifically, Morck et al. (1988) document a statistically significant and 
positive DOWN-performance link at lower levels (0% to 5% - interests convergence), a 
statistically significant and negative relationship at moderate levels (5% to 25% - 
entrenchment), and additionally a statistically significant and positive association at higher 
levels (above 25% - interests convergence) of DOWN.  
Their evidence suggests that at low levels of DOWN, interests alignment helps to 
increase corporate performance, while at high levels, director entrenchment negatively 
affects performance. Recent US and UK studies by McConnell and Servaes (1990), 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Short and Keasey (1999), Weir and Laing (2000), and 
Davies et al. (2005) have supported the non-monotonic DOWN-performance link. 
 By contrast, using a sample of 87 Greek listed firms, Krivogorsky (2006) report 
that DOWN impacts positively on corporate performance. Consistent with the evidence of 
Krivogorsky (2006), Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) document a positive association 
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between DOWN and performance in a sample of 175 Greek listed firms. This suggests that 
the market perceives DOWN to be providing extra incentive to enhance performance.  
A third stream of empirical papers documents no relationship between DOWN and 
corporate performance. For example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) report no cross-sectional 
link between DOWN and corporate performance for 511 US listed firms from 1984 to 1989. 
Re-examining previous US evidence using a sample of 600 listed firms from 1984 to 1992, 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) report a spurious correlation between DOWN and corporate 
performance. They find that a large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in DOWN is 
explained by firm-level characteristics like size, cash flow, capital, and advertising intensity, 
amongst others. They suggest that DOWN is rather endogenous in corporate performance 
regressions, casting serious doubts on prior US evidence that indicates that managerial 
ownership is exogenously related to corporate performance.  
 Despite the conflicting empirical evidence, and as has previously been discussed, 
the King Reports encourage directors to hold shares of companies that they manage, 
including specifying that the performance-related elements of directors’ remuneration, such 
as stock options should constitute a substantial portion of their total remuneration package 
in order to align their interests with those of shareholders. It should also be designed to 
provide incentives to directors to perform at the highest operational levels. This indicates 
that the King Reports expect DOWN to have a positive impact on corporate performance, 
and thus our main hypothesis is that.   
 H1: There is a statistically significant and positive relationship between DOWN 
and corporate performance. 
 
 
Data and Research Methodology 
Sample and Data 
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Our initial samples consisted of a total of 402 firms from ten industries that were 
listed on the JSE as at 31 December 2007. The industries included basic materials, 
consumer goods, consumer services, financials, health care, industrials, oil & gas, 
technology, telecoms, and utilities. We excluded 111 financials and utilities due to 
regulatory and capital structure reasons. This limited our sample to 291 firms from eight 
non-financial industries. Financial and CG data were needed to investigate the link between 
DOWN and corporate performance. The CG variables were extracted from the sampled 
firms’ annual reports. The annual reports were downloaded from the Perfect Information 
Database. The financial data was obtained from DataStream. We set two main criteria for 
the firms that were included in our final sample to meet: the accessibility to a company’s 
complete five-year annual reports from 2002 to 2006; and the availability of a company’s 
corresponding financial data from 2003 to 2007.1   
Our sample inclusion criteria were set for a number of reasons. First, and in line 
with past studies (Henry, 2008; Beiner et al., 2006), the criteria ensured that the 
requirements for a balanced panel data analysis were met. A number of advantages that can 
be obtained for using panel data include having: (i) both time-series and cross-sectional 
observations; (ii) more degrees of freedom; and (iii) less multi-collinearity among the 
variables (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010). Second, an investigation of five-year data 
with both cross-sectional and time-series properties may help in ascertaining whether the 
observed cross-sectional link between DOWN and corporate performance holds over-time 
                                                 
1
Corporate board decisions take time to reflect in corporate performance (Laing and Weir, 1999; Ntim and Osei, 2011). 
Thus, to circumvent potential endogenous link between DOWN and corporate performance, we introduce a one year lag 
between DOWN and corporate performance such that this year’s corporate performance depends on last year’s CG 
structure, as specified in equation (1). The sample also begins from 2002 for two reasons. First, second King Report 
became operational in 2002, and secondly, data coverage in Perfect Information/DataStream on SA listed firms was low 
until 2002. The sample ends in 2007 because it is the year for which data was available.  
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(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Ntim et al., 2012). This can also permit direct comparisons to 
be drawn with the findings of previous studies (Davies et al., 2005; Cheung and Wei, 2006). 
Applying our sample selection criteria, the complete data needed for our empirical analysis 
was obtained for a total of 169 firms over five-firm years and 8 industries.  
 
Variables: Dependent, Independents and Controls 
This subsection presents all the three main types of variables that we use in our 
empirical examination. First, our main independent variable is DOWN. Second, Tobin’s Q 
(Q) is our main dependent variable, but as a robustness check, we employ return on assets 
(ROA) and total share return (TSR) to ascertain how robust are results are to alternative 
accounting and market-based  corporate performance measures, respectively. Finally, and 
following past studies (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990), we include below a 
number of control variables.  
First, companies with greater investment opportunities tend to grow faster (Henry 
2008; Ntim and Osei, 2011), and are more likely to generate higher corporate performance. 
Thus, our prediction is that sales growth (GROWTH) will relate positively to corporate 
performance. Second, companies with higher investment in research and development can 
gain competitive advantages (Yermack, 1996; Short and Keasey, 1999), and thus may be able 
to generate higher corporate performance. By contrast, research and development is capital 
intensive activity (Weir and Laing, 2000; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001), and therefore 
may impact negatively on corporate performance.  
Also, greater debt usage can improve corporate performance by effectively 
minimising managerial ability to expropriate ‘free cash flows’ (Jensen 1986; Ntim, 2012). 
In contrast, greater use of debt can increase bankruptcy risks, and impact negatively on 
corporate performance by minimising the ability of companies to utilise growth 
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opportunities (Jensen, 1986; Ntim et al., 2011). Similarly, and due to higher agency 
problems, larger companies can be expected to have good CG mechanisms (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006), and therefore may impact positively on corporate 
performance. By contrast, smaller companies tend to have greater investment and growth 
opportunities (Beiner et al., 2006; Guest, 2009), and therefore may be able to generate 
higher corporate performance. As a result of the mixed theoretical expectations, we predict 
that gearing (GEAR), capital expenditure (CAPEX) and firm size (LNTA) will either have a 
negative or positive impact on corporate performance.  
Third, companies that are cross-listed on international stock markets are more likely 
to have greater access to funds and investment opportunities (Ntim, 2009; Ntim et al., 
2012), and therefore may have a positive effect on corporate performance. Therefore, we 
expect that cross-listing (CROSLIST) will be positively associated with corporate 
performance. Fourth, it has been suggested that audit firm size is positively related to 
auditor independence and audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981; Ntim and Osei, 2011), and thus 
companies audited by large audit firms may have a positive impact on corporate 
performance. Thus, we hypothesise that audit firm size (BIG4) will be positively associated 
with corporate performance.  
Fifth, as government ownership provides access to critical resources, such as 
finance and profitable government contracts (Ntim et al., 2011; Ntim, 2012), we 
hypothesise that government ownership (GOVOWN) will correlate positively with 
corporate performance. Sixth, companies that voluntarily set-up CG committee to 
specifically monitor CG standards may have higher ability to reduce managerial ability to 
expropriate corporate resources (Ntim et al., 2011; Ntim and Osei, 2011), and thus may 
generate higher corporate performance. Hence, we predict that the presence of a CG 
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committee (CGCOM) will be positively associated with corporate performance. Finally, 
and in line with past studies (Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009), we 
hypothesise that corporate performance will differ across different industries and financial 
years. Therefore, we include industry (INDUST) dummies for the 5 remaining industries2: 
basic materials and oil & gas; consumer goods; consumer services and health care; 
industrials; and technology & telecoms; and year (YD) dummies for the financial years 
2003 to 2007.  
 
Empirical Analyses 
Summary Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 contains full definitions and summary descriptive statistics of all variables 
that we employ in carrying out our empirical investigation. All values generally indicate a 
wide spread. For example, and in line with the findings of Beiner et al. (2006), Henry (2008) 
and Guest (2009), Q ranges from a minimum of 0.58 and a maximum of 3.58 with mean of 
1.52, depicting wide spread. DOWN also displays wide variation, ranging from a minimum 
of 0% to a maximum of 100% with an average of 19%. The alternative corporate 
performance measures (i.e., ROA and TSR), and the control variables (i.e., BIG4, CAPEX, 
CGCOM, CROSLIST, GEAR, GOVOWN, and GROWTH) indicate wide spread, implying 
that our sample has been sufficiently selected to achieve adequate variation, and thus 
eschews any possibilities of sample selection bias.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
                                                 
2
As there was insufficient number of observations in 3 industries, namely health care, oil and gas, and telecoms industries 
with three, one and three listed companies, respectively, were merged with the closest remaining five major industries. 
Consequently, the three health care companies were included in the consumer services industry, the one oil and gas firm 
was added to the basic materials industry, whilst the three telecoms firms were also shared out to the technology industry. 
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We also tested linear regression assumptions of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, 
normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity. We tested the multicollinearity assumption by 
carrying out the Spearman non-parametric and Pearson parametric bivariate correlation 
tests among the variables. The results, which for brevity not reported, but available upon 
request, suggested that no serious non-normalities and multicollinearities existed among the 
variables. In addition, we examined scatter, P-P and Q-Q plots, studentised residuals, 
Cook’s distances and Durbin-Watson statistics of the variables, and the tests also indicated 
no serious violation of the linear regression assumptions of homoscedasticity, linearity, 
normality and autocorrelation, suggesting that it is appropriate to carry out multivariate 
regression analyses.    
 
Multivariate Regression Analyses 
Companies tend to differ in the challenges and prospects that they encounter over 
time (Henry, 2008; Ntim et al., 2012). This can lead to situation whereby DOWN and Q are 
jointly and dynamically determined by company-level heterogeneities, such as corporate 
complexity, culture and managerial talent (Guest, 2009; Ntim, 2009), which simple OLS 
regressions may fail to identify (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010), and thereby leading to 
misleading results (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006). Thus, given the panel 
nature of our data, as well as in line with past studies (Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009; Ntim et 
al., 2012), we carry out fixed-effects regressions in order to address possible unobserved 
company-level characteristics. We start our analysis with basic fixed-effects regression 
specified as follows: 
               ∑
=
−−−− ++++=
n
i
itititiitit CONTROLSDOWNQ
1
111110 εδββα                    (1) 
where: Q is the dependent variable, DOWN is the independent variable, CONTROLS refers 
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to the control variables, including BIG4, CAPEX, CGCOM, CROSLIST, GEAR, GOVOWN, 
GROWTH, INDUST and YD, and δ refers to the company-level fixed-effects, consisting of 
a vector of 168 year dummies to represent the 169 sampled companies. 
 Table 2 contains fixed-effects regressions results of the impact of DOWN on Q. 
First, to determine whether DOWN affects Q, we regress Q on the DOWN excluding the 
control variables using equation (1). Statistically significant and positive effect of DOWN 
on Q is noticeable in Model 1 of Table 2. However, the coefficient on the constant term is 
statistically significant, suggesting that there may be omitted variables bias. Thus, to 
ascertain whether our evidence is spuriously caused by omitted variables bias, we re-run 
equation (1) by including the control variables. The coefficient of DOWN on Q in Model 2 
of Table 2 is statistically significant and positive, and thereby providing support for H1, as 
well as the recommendations of the King Reports.  
 Our evidence also provides support for the results of past studies (Krivogorsky, 2006; 
Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007) that report a positive association between DOWN and 
corporate performance, but inconsistent with those that report a negative effect of DOWN 
on corporate performance (Laing and Weir, 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). 
Theoretically, our results provide support for agency theory, which suggests that DOWN 
can reduce agency problems by aligning more closely the interests of shareholders and 
corporate executives, and thereby improving corporate performance.  
 Second, and to explore possible non-linear association between DOWN and 
corporate performance, as suggested by Morck et al. (1988), we re-estimate equation (1) by 
replacing DOWN with DOWN2.  Positive, but statistically insignificant impact of DOWN2 
on Q is observable in Model 3 of Table 2. However, the coefficient on the constant term in 
Model 3 of Table 2 is statistically significant and seems to suggest that the model may be 
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suffering from omitted variables bias. Thus, to ascertain whether our results are not falsely 
driven by omitted variables bias, we add the control variables in Model 4 to address 
potential omitted variables bias. Positive, but statistically insignificant effect of DOWN2 on 
Q is still clearly noticeable in Model 4 of Table 2. As further check, we investigate 
additional non-monotonic link between DOWN and performance by cubing (DOWN3) 
instead of squaring DOWN with the results presented in Model 5 of Table 2 being similarly 
statistically insignificant, and thereby failing to provide support for H1, as well as the results 
of past studies that report significant curvilinear association between DOWN and corporate 
performance (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Davies et al., 2005; Cheung and Wei, 2006).   
Insert Table 2 about here 
Finally, and the coefficients on the control variables in Models 2, 4 and 5 of Table 2 
are generally consistent with our hypotheses. For instance and as predicted, the coefficients 
on CAPEX, GEAR and LNTA are statistically significant and negatively related to Q, 
whereas BIG4, CGCOM, CROSLIST, GOVOWN and GROWTH are statistically significant 
and positively associated with Q, in Models 2, 4 and 5. Finally, the F-values in Models 2 to 
5 of Table 2 consistently reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the main 
independent and the control variables are equal to zero. Similar to the results of previous 
studies (Yermack, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006), the adjusted R2 is between 2% and 30%, 
indicating that our fixed-effects regressions can explain significant differences in our 
sampled companies’ Q. 
 
Robustness Analyses 
Our fixed-effects estimations so far do not take into account the presence of 
potential endogeneity problems and alternative corporate performance measures. This 
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implies that our evidence of a significant positive link between DOWN and corporate 
performance, for instance, may be spurious. In this subsection, we investigate how sensitive 
our results are to the presence of: (i) alternative corporate performance measures; and (ii) 
endogeneity problems.  
First, and as previously noted, we investigate the robustness of our findings to two 
alternative corporate performance measures: return on assets (ROA – an accounting based 
proxy) and total share returns (TSR – a market based measure). Models 6 and 7 of Table 2 
present findings obtained by using ROA and TSR, respectively, instead of Q. Statistically 
significant and positive effect of DOWN on ROA and TSR in models 6 and 7 of Table 2, 
respectively, is observable, and thereby indicating that our results are robust to the use of 
either an accounting (ROA) or a market (TSR) based corporate performance measure, 
instead of Q. 
Second, to account for additional endogeneity problems that may arise due to 
omitted variables, we conduct the widely applied two-stage least squares (2SLS) technique 
(Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008). However, to make sure that the 2SLS methodology is 
appropriate, and following Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Beiner et al. (2006), we first 
carry out Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test (see Beiner et al., 2006, p. 267) to 
determine whether an endogenous link exists between DOWN and Q. Applied to equation 
(1), the test rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity, and thus we conclude that the 2SLS 
technique may be appropriate and that our earlier results based on the fixed-effects 
regressions may be misleading. In the first stage, we conjecture that DOWN will be 
determined by the control variables specified in equation (1). In the second stage, we 
employ the predicted portion of the DOWN (PRE_DOWN) as an instrument for the DOWN 
and re-estimate equation (1) as specified below: 
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                              ∑
=
++++=
n
i
itititiitit CONTROLSDOWNQ
1
10
ˆ εδββα                           (2) 
whereby everything remains unchanged as specified in equation (1)3 except that we use the 
predicted DOWN (PRE_DOWN) from the first-stage regression as an instrument for the 
DOWN. Statistically significant and positive effect of the PRE_DOWN on Q is clearly 
observable in Model 8 of Table 2, and thereby suggesting that our evidence of a positive 
effect of DOWN on Q is robust to endogeneity problems that may be caused by potential 
omitted variables. Overall, the robustness analyses indicate that our results are fairly robust 
to different types of potential endogeneity problems and alternative corporate performance 
measures.  
   
Summary and Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the association between director shareownership (DOWN) and 
corporate performance using a sample of 169 South African (SA) listed firms from 2002 to 
2007. This coincides with a period during which the SA authorities pursued incentive 
alignment and corporate governance (CG) reforms that primarily focused on raising CG 
standards in SA firms, primarily in the form of the 1994 and 2002 King Reports. More 
specifically, the reforms have focused on reducing agency costs by aligning the interests of 
shareholders and executives, as well as improving the independence and monitoring 
capacity of corporate boards, and thereby enhancing corporate performance. 
 Our results suggest a statistically significant and positive association between 
DOWN and corporate performance. By contrast, we find no evidence of a non-linear effect 
of DOWN on corporate performance. Our findings are robust across a raft of econometric 
                                                 
3
As estimating a lagged structure will invalidate the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010), we 
estimate equation (2) as un-lagged structure. An additional advantage is that it allows us to ascertain the robustness of our 
results against estimating an un-lagged structure.  
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models that control for different types of endogeneity problems and corporate performance 
proxies. Overall, our results provide support for agency theory, which suggests that DOWN 
can reduce agency problems by aligning more closely the interests of shareholders and 
corporate executives, and thereby improving corporate performance.  
Our evidence also has important policy and regulatory implications. Whereas our 
evidence that high levels of DOWN impacts positively on corporate performance provides 
support for the recommendations of the King Reports, the relatively low levels of DOWN 
among the sampled firms indicates that there is the need to strengthen compliance and 
enforcement. In this case, setting-up a “compliance and enforcement committee” to 
regularly encourage and monitor the levels of compliance among listed firms may help in 
improving CG standards by enhancing incentive and monitoring mechanisms in SA. 
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Table 1 
Summary Descriptive Statistics of All Variables for All 845 Firm Years 
Variable   Mean            Median              S.D.       Maximum         Minimum 
Panel A: Corporate Performance (Dependent) variables 
Q                 1.52    1.33    0.69               3.58               0.58  
ROA (%)                      10.26             10.97  12.21  36.55            -23.19  
TSR (%)              33.57              29.60             48.68            173.41            -55.20 
Panel B: Corporate governance (Independent) variable 
DOWN (%)   19.24  88.73             18.25            100.00                0.00 
Panel C: Control variables 
BIG4 (%)                     73.25            100.00                44.29              100.00                0.00 
CAPEX (%)              11.08   6.28  13.86    64.46                0.00 
CGCOM (%)   35.80   0.00  48.00            100.00                0.00 
CROSLIST (%)  21.66   0.00  41.21            100.00                0.00 
GEAR (%)              34.78            14.63             55.02            270.65                0.00 
GOVOWN (%)             38.00   0.00  49.00            100.00                0.00 
GROWTH (%)  14.40            12.60             24.94             88.26             -41.88 
LNTA      5.95               5.97                  0.89                  7.60                 4.08 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s Q (Q), measured as the ratio of total assets minus book value 
of equity plus market value of equity to total assets.  Return on assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of operating 
profit to total assets. Total shareholder returns (TSR), calculated as annualised total share returns made up of 
share price and dividends. Director shareownership (DOWN), measured as the percentage of common shares 
held by all directors. Audit firm size (BIG4), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm 
is audited by a big four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touché, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 
0 otherwise. Capital expenditure (CAPEX), calculated as the ratio of total capital expenditure to total assets. 
Cross-listing (CROSLIST), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm is cross-listed to 
a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise. The presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM), defined as 
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise. 
Gearing (GEAR), calculated as the ratio of total debts to market value of equity. Government ownership 
(GOVOWN), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if government ownership is at least 5%, 
0 otherwise. Sales growth (GROWTH), calculated as the current year’s sales minus last year’s sales to last 
year’s sales. Firm size (LNTA), measured as the natural log of total assets. 
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